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Introduction
Verifiable signature sharing schemes enable the holder of a signed document (who may not be the original signer) to distribute the signature among a set of proxies in such a way that each proxy can verify whether a valid signature can be reconstructed later, even if some of the proxies (but not too many) are malicious or if the original signer is malicious. The signature itself is not revealed until later when it is reconstructed. Verifiable signature sharing is related to the distributed verification of undeniable signatures [18] and to threshold signatures schemes [8] . However there are fundamental differences. With the distributed verification of undeniable signatures, the signed document is public and secret information for the signature is shared. With threshold signatures the power to sign (not l o verify) is shared. Such schemes enable any sufficiently large set of shareholders to construct the signature of any document, without any further interaction with the signer.
Verifiable signature sharing has many applications. It can be used to escrow digital cash, by verifiably sharing the signature of a bank for a banknote. Another application is the secure distribution of financial services such as auction bidding [ 111.
At Eurocrypt '95 Franklin and Reiter presented practical verifiable signature sharing protocols for several signature schemes, including RSA (exponentiation) based signatures with small exponents' e and El Gamal based signatures [lo] .
In this paper we introduce a new approach based on homomorphisms of secret At the Rump session of Crypto '95 the authors pointed out that their scheme for RSA with e = 3 was flawed, and that various repairs were considered [12] .
U. Maurer (Ed.): Advances in Cryptology -EUROCRYPT '96, LNCS 1070, pp. 96-106, 1996. 0 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 sharing schemes to describe verifiable signature sharing. We use this to extend the Franklin Reiter protocol for El Gamal signatufes to a more general setting, and obtain an optimal' verifiable signature sharing scheme. Our construction is natural and simplifies significantly the protocol for RSA based signatures in [lo] .
Definitions and notation
Let A = (1,. . . ,n} be a set of proxies, K a set of secrets, S1, .. . , S, sets of shares, and V = S1 x . . . x S, the set of n-tuples of elements from Si. . . . , si7) = k.
Finally we denote by { S ( k ) } the set of all c E V output by S on input k.
We shall assume that the scheme ( S , R ) belongs to a family {(Sz,'Rz)} indexed by a parameter t E J , J c {0,1}*, but for simplicity of notation, when there is no ambiguity, we do not refer explicitly to 2 and just consider single schemes rather than families. That is, the mapping h commutes with the sharing and reconstruction operators. (s,) and k = R(sl,.. . , sn), outputs k* = ho(k). We call this, the scheme induced by the homomorhism h.
Remark.
One should distinguish between homomorphisms of threshold schemes, as introduced here, and homomorphic threshold schemes [l] . With the former no algebraic structure is imposed on the set of secrets or on the shares. However, if "*" is a binary operation on the set of secrets K and ". Remark. Homomorphisms are an important structure preserving mechanism in algebra. As we shall see they also play an important role in the analysis of cryptographic primitives, by linking verifiable signature sharing to secret sharing.
of secret sharing schemes Verifiable signature sharing based on homomorphisms
The scheme we describe is based on a homomorphism h = (ho, hl,. . . , hn) of the ( t , n)-threshold schemes CT, a', and uses the induced threshold scheme h(u). 
. , T, in ~( c T ) .
At the end of this protocol the proxies either accept or reject. In the reconstruction protocol a reconstructor R computes s g n ( r n ) by majority vote. The scheme is described schematically in Fig 2. In the upper part we use the zero-knowledge scheme u = ( S , R ) and the shares s, are kept secret. In the lower part we use the erasure scheme h(a) = (R',S') and the shares h;(s;) are in the clear. The homomorphism h links the parts. The path S ( s g n ( m ) ) + S*(rn) is used for verification: proxy i checks that the map h,(s;) of his share s, is the appropriate component of ( h l ( s l ) , . . . , hn(sn) ), which he gets by extending ( h l ( s l ) , . . . , ~T ( s T ) ) using the message rn. The commutativity of the diagram guarantees correctness. We now describe our scheme in detail. 
Reconstruction Protocol
Step 1 Each proxy P i sends to the reconstructor R the following information:
a. The shares si sent in Step l a of the Sharing Protocol. (all.. . , a n ) E {S*(rT2)} of (a1,. . . , 7 z T ) .
We shall prove that this protocol achieves a slightly stronger goal than in [lo] .
Definition 6. A verifiable signature sharing scheme is T-resilient if the following conditions hold.
( i ) (Completeness)
If the dealer is honest and at most T proxies are faulty then honest proxies accept, and the reconstruction is successful.
( i i ) ( S o u n d n e s s )
If at most T proxies are faulty and an honest proxy accepts, then every proxy accepts and the reconstruction is successful.
(iii) (Secrecy) Anything that can be computed by an adversary who, (a) controls up to T faulty proxies who have participated in earlier sharing protocols with an honest dealer and (b) has access to the view of the reconstructor in earlier reconstructions, can also be computed by the adversary without participating in any of these protocols.
Remark.
Secrecy is based on the simulation of the view of the adversary. To simulate the shares of faulty (dishonest) proxies in the sharing protocols, u must be zero-knowledge. To simulate the (uncorrupted) shares of the honest proxies revealed in the reconstruction protocols, h(u) must be minimal knowledge.
Remark. Our definition of secrecy is stronger than that in [lo] , since we allow the adversary to access earlier reconstruction protocols. We feel that this is an essential security requirement for verifiable signature sharing. Although the schemes proposed in [lo] satisfy the stronger secrecy requirement, their model overlooked this aspect.
If ho is a one-way function then this scheme can also be used as a verifiable secret sharing scheme with heuristic security. The security is only heuristic because with one-way functions there is no guarantee that the input will not leak. 
Corollary 10. A polynomial-time threshold scheme which is a perfectly zeroknowledge polynomial-time erasure scheme is perfectly minimal knowledge.
Proof. Take a = a ' and h the identity homomorphism in Lemma 8.
Proof of the theorem:
Completeness: This follows directly from the fact that h is a homomorphism.
Soundness: If one honest proxy accepts then all honest proxies accept. We must show that in this case the reconstruction is successful. First observe that h(a) is a polynomial-time erasure scheme. So (~1 , .
. . , q ) has a unique extension c* = ($7,. . . , s t ) in h(a) with R(c*) = m, which can be computed in polynomialtime. Allowing for up to T COMPLAINS and up to T faulty proxies we see that at most 2T of the components of c* are in error in the majority vote count. Since n -2T 2 T + 1 = t , there is a set B = {ill.. . , iT} of T 2 t proxies with shares ( s i l ) (h(c), c, sgn(m) ). In this case the simulator is also given the signature sgn(m). By Corollary 10, c is minimal-knowledge, so c can be simu-0 lated. Then h(c) can be simulated, since h is polynomial-time.
Remark. For this scheme T 5 (n -1)/3. The upper (exclusive) bound for the number faulty processors in a fault tolerant distributed computation in the information theoretic model is n/3 [2, 4] . So the scheme is optimal in this respect.
Applications

5.1
Frankel zero-knowledge RSA threshold scheme Take (T to be the zero-knowledge RSA threshold scheme in [8] with u ' = CT. This scheme is homomorphic (cf. the Remark after Definition 5) and uses polynomial interpolation for the reconstruction of the secret. In this case however the coefficients of the polynomials are not taken from a field but from a ring extension Z[u] of the integers. We briefly explain this scheme.
Let N be a composite number, n be polynomially bounded in IN\, q a prime with q 2 n + 1, and Z[u] = Z[z]/((zq -l)/(z -1)) be the ring of all polynomial expressions in u with integer coefficients taken modulo the cyclotomic polynomial and that h is a homomorphism of 0 onto 0. It is easy to prove that all the other conditions of Theorem 7 are satisfied. In particular 0 is an erasure scheme. Also { S { 1 , . . , ,~} ( k ) } = (ZY,)T, so that one only has to check membership in each of the components Z;, to check membership in { S i l , , . , , T } ( k ) } .
Thus we have a T-resilient verifiable signature sharing scheme.
DiCrescenzo-Burmester zero-knowledge threshold scheme
A Verifiable Signature Sharing scheme based on the DesmedtTake CT to be the perfect zero-knowledge threshold scheme in [5] with 0 ' = 0. This scheme is multiplicative and the set of secrets K ( * ) can be any group (not necessarily abelian). The shares are sets of sub-shares which are tuples (list,, k,). A set B o f t distinct proxies can recompute the secret k by taking the product of appropriate k,'s whose selection depends on B , and is determined by the lists list,. The lists define selection functions f j ,~( s j ) , j E B , which are such that equation (1) in Section 2 holds. The functions f j ,~ commute with any homomorphism of the multiplicative group K(*). We take ho to be a one-way injective group homomorphism of a polynomial-time group K(*) (for which the operation "*" and its inversc are polynomial-time). As in the previous case we use ho to define injections hi on the shares s, (for which each (list,, k,) is mapped to (list,, ho(k,))). Then conditions (2) hold, as can easily be checked, and we get a homomorphism from CF to CF. It is easy to check that 0 is an erasure scheme when t = 2. All conditions of Theorem 7 are then satisfied. So we get a 1-resilient verifiable signature scheme. In this case the size of the shares is reduced, roughly, from n l o g N to (logn)(logN).
Conclusion
We have shown that by using homomorphisms of secret sharing schemes we can get RSA based verifiable signature sharing schemes which are optimal with respect to the number of faulty processors. Our approach is natural, uses existing secret sharing schemes, and simplifies significantly the RSA based protocol of Franklin and Reiter [lo] .
